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Abstract
In our recent model, the cooperation emerges as a positive feedback
between a not-too-bad reputation and an altruistic attitude. Here we
introduce a bias of altruism as to favorize members of the same group. The
matrix Fi,j of frequency of cooperation between agents i and j reveals the
structure of communities. The Newman algorithm reproduces the initial
bias. The method based on differential equations detects two groups of
agents cooperating within their groups, leaving the uncooperative ones
aside.
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1 Introduction
Despite the widespread using of game theory [1, 2] in social sciences, its range
of applications remains disputable. The question, to what extent people are
rational in their decisions, created a rich set of research points of view, includ-
ing the concept of evolutionary thinking [3]. Axelrod discussed this question
in terms of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), a famous thought experiment which
demostrates that according to game theory in many situations a cooperation is
not rational. Then, PD become a common method of real and computational
experiments. To complete the list of references is beyond our chance and aim;
we refer to [4, 5, 6, 7]. Although the formulation of PD relies on the concepts of
payoffs and rational choice, some recent experiments exceed this frame. In 2006
De Cremer and Stouten showed [8] that the conditions of cooperation are trust
and some common goal to achieve; the latter was measured with the ’Inclusion
of Other with the Self’ scale [9]. In the same year the results of Mulder et
al. [10] indicated that sanctioning defection itself can weaken the motivation of
players to cooperate. These results, obtained within the scheme of the public
good experiment [11, 12], show that a reliable theory of cooperation cannot be
limited to the assumption of an idividual and selfish rationality, but it should
include some collectivistic attitudes, as for example preserving of social norms.
The same conclusion can be drawn from the results of the ultimatum game,
when played by members of different societies [13].
Here we are interested in a contribution of cooperation to the process of
the formation of social groups. Although in a society this process usually runs
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in a longer timescale than a standard experiment, some information could be
drawn from a search of cooperation in already established groups. Here how-
ever, the outcome varies strongly from one particular case to another. Some-
times boundaries between groups seem to disappear, as those reported in [14]
between Japanese and American students in Hokkaido. The data collected in
Bosnia and North Causasus indicate, that the likelihood of intergroup trust
and cooperation depends more on cultural and economic status than on per-
sonal - often crude - experience [15]. In other cases, as the one with Australian
and Singaporean students [16], the results are less conclusive. The difference
in timescale, noted above, was to some extent evaded in the PD experiment
performed by Goette et al. [17]. The groups investigated there were platoons
of males formed for four-week period of officer training in the Swiss army. As
individuals were randomly assigned to different platoons, the experiment was
free from the confounding effect of self-selection into groups. The intra-group
cooperation was found to be clearly stronger than the inter-group one. Also,
individuals believed that members of their own platoons were more willing to
cooperate. These results are closely akin to those of [8].
Recently we proposed a new model of cooperation, formulated without use
of the concepts of payoff and utility [18]. In this model, the only model vari-
ables were reputations and altruisms of individual players. Both these variables
entered to the expression of the probability of cooperation of one player with
another. The only difference between the variables was their time dependence;
while the reputation varied in each game, the level of altruism remained con-
stant. The aim of this work is to apply the same model to the intra- and
inter-group cooperation. Accordingly, we are going to admit that the reputa-
tion and the altruism can be different within the group and between the groups.
The paper is organized as follows. Next section is devoted to the model, as
formulated in [18], and to a brief conclusion of its results for one group. In the
same Section we explain how the model is generalized to the case of two groups.
In Section 3 we report the way how the group structure is investigated; here we
base on methods of [19, 20]. Numerical results are described in Section 4 and
discussed in Section 5.
2 The model
The game is performed between N agents placed at nodes of a fully connected
graph. To each agent, two parameters are assigned: reputationWi and altruism
ǫi, where i = 1, ..., N . The altruisms ǫi are random numbers from the homo-
geneous distribution on the range (−0.5, 0.5), and these values remain constant
during the game. Initial values of the reputations Wi = 0.5. Once an agent
cooperates, hers/his reputation is transformed as Wi → (1 +Wi)/2; otherwise
Wi →Wi/2. At each time step a pair of agents (i, j) is selected randomly from
the whole set. The probability P (i, j) that i cooperates with j is calculated as
the fractional part of Wj + ǫi; once this outcome is negative, P (i, j) is set to
zero, once it is larger than 1, P (i, j) is set to 1 [18].
The most important result of the model is presented in Fig. 1. What is
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Figure 1: The probability of four different outcomes of PD against the time
average of the reputation < Wi >.
shown there are frequencies of four situations met by an agent i against the
time average of the reputation < Wi >. The situations are: 1. both i and his
partner cooperate, with the outcome R; 2. both i and his partner defects, with
the outcome U; 3. i cooperates but his partner defects, with the outcome S;
4. i defects but his partner cooperates, with the outcome T. As we see in Fig.
1, for agents with positive mean reputation W the mutual cooperation is most
frequent. On the contrary, agents with negative mean reputation < W > defect
in most cases: same do their partners. A similar plot was shown in [18], with
the difference that there, the altruism ǫ was used in the horizontal axis. We
note that if we use the a temporary value of reputation Wi and not its time
average < Wi >, the plot is so noisy that it is hard to see anything [18].
3 Group structure
To investigate the group formation, here we divide the whole set of N nodes into
two halves, each of N/2 nodes and we introduce an additional bias parameter
κ. The role of κ is to enhance the intra-group cooperation and to weaken the
inter-group one. With this purpose in mind, we apply the bias in two alternative
ways: i) by adding κ to the initial values of reputations of i and j if these nodes
belong to the same group, and by reducing the initial values of reputations if
i and j belong to different groups. For each i, this change of reputation Wi
is done only once, when i plays for the first time. ii) by a similar increase
(reduction) of attitudes ǫi, ǫj by κ when i, j are in the same (different) groups.
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The parameter κ varies from zero to 0.3.
The object to investigate now is the matrix Fi,j which measures the fre-
quency of cooperation of each two agents i, j. This matrix contains an infor-
mation of a possible cluster structure of our network. Here we investigate it
by two methods: the Newman algorithm (NM) [19] and our recent method by
means of differential equations (DF) [20]. As all other methods designed for an
identification the cluster structure [21], these two methods have to extract this
structure from an initial noised information.
The Newman algorithm is based on the time evolution of modularity Q -
a quantity which measures the departure of the actual graph structure from a
random one. The formula is [22]
Q =
1
2m
∑
i,j
[
Fi,j −
kikj
2m
]
δ(ci, cj) (1)
where ki =
∑
j Fi,j , 2m =
∑
ij Fi,j and δ(ci, cj) = 1 if i, j belong to the same
cluster; otherwise δ(ci, cj) = 0. We start from all N nodes separated and we
add links as to get maximal possible value of Q at each step. We accept the
obtained cluster structure at the moment when Q is maximal. For a more de-
tailed description we refer to [19].
Our algorithm with differential equations relies also on the modularity Q,
but the time dependence of the connectivity matrix Ci, j is given by
dCi,j
dt
= Θ(Ci,j)Θ(1− Ci,j)
∑
k 6=i,j
(Ci,kCk,j − β) (2)
where Θ(x) = 0 for x < 0 and 1 in the opposite, and β is a parameter. Our
former numerical results suggest that the formalism works well if β > 0.4. Here,
the frequency matrix elements Fi,j serve as initial values of Ci,j . Again, we
break the time evolution at the moment when Q gets its maximal value. The
detailed description is given in [20].
4 Results
Calculations are performed for N=300 nodes, i.e. for the frequency matrix
300× 300. The correlation between ǫi and Wi, initially equal to zero, increases
and reaches its stationary value about 0.06 after 103 games. All the results are
then gathered after this transient time. As a rule, 15 × 105 games are played.
The frequency matrix was obtained for both methods of using κ to modify the
initial reputation Wi or the altruism ǫi. For each of these methods and for the
system of N = 300 nodes we got four frequency matrices Fi,j for κ= 0.0, 0.1,
0.2 and 0.3. These matrices can be used to produce the plots like our Fig. 1.
There are only slight differences between these plots made for κ=0.0 and 0.3.
For both ways of using the bias κ, i.e. with modified reputation or altru-
ism, NM gives the same results. This method gives always two clusters. For
κ = 0, their sizes are: 162 nodes, with mean ǫ= -0.113, and 138 nodes with
mean ǫ= 0.126. This could mean that the partition is roughly into defecting
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and cooperating agents. However, for κ=0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 the Newman algorithm
reproduces exactly the division of the network into two groups which were meant
to cooperate by using the probabilities P (i, j) with the preferences done by κ.
In these groups, mean values of ǫ are close to zero.
Figure 2: The cluster structure of the network of 300 nodes, described by
the frequency matrix for the bias κ = 0.3 (color online). For clarity of the
picture, links where Fi,j < 0.5 are omitted. Two clusters at the centre (grey
and black, or green and blue online) are due to two internally cooperating
groups, obtained with DF. As we see, there is also some cooperation between
groups. The mean reputation of other nodes around the centre (white colour)
is negative. The figure reveals that actually they cooperate to some extent, but
almost exclusively within the initial division.
The results of DF [20] are different. In the case when the initial reputations
Wi are modified, we have one cluster: there is no partition. When the altruisms
ǫi are modified, for κ= 0.0, 0.1 and 0.2 and the parameter β > 0.1 again there
is no partition. For κ= 0.3 and all used values of β (from 0.1 to 1.0) we get two
clusters, with their sizes varying between 69 and 78 nodes; however, the size
difference was not larger than 4 nodes. The obtained structure is visualised in
Fig. 2. The altruism parameter ǫ averaged over each of those clusters, varied
between 0.25 and 0.29. As we see, this partition captures cooperating agents in
two groups. We deduce it from the mean values of ǫ for the clusters and from if
their size. In the thermodynamic limit, we could expect the size to be N/4 and
the mean altruism parameters to be 0.25. These limit values are close to those
obtained in our simulation.
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5 Discussion
Our question was, if the proposed model can account for the preference of coop-
eration within groups. The criterion designed here is, if the cooperation pattern,
encoded in the frequency matrix F , is detectable as the structure of communi-
ties in the network. Both for the Newman algorithm [19] and for our method
[20] the answer is affirmative. Although the answer is different in these two
methods, in both cases we get a piece of nontrivial information. For κ > 0,
the Newman algorithm just reproduces the initial bias: the agents which should
cooperate more willingly with each other do belong to the same cluster. This
structure does not reflect the fact that many agents do not cooperate at all.
For κ=0, the structure obtained with the Newman method is different: there
are two clusters, one of them more cooperative than the other. However, this
division is not strict; in our model a half of agents do cooperate. Basically, a
most straightforward result for κ = 0 would be that there is no division at all.
The second method based on differential equations gives exactly this result
- one cluster - for κ = 0. However, the same result is obtained also for κ =
0.1 and 0.2. It is only for κ = 0.3 when the algorithm detects two groups of
agents cooperating within their groups, leaving the uncooperative agents aside.
This result is the most expected one, as it gives an information both on the
group structure and on the cooperative attitude of members of these groups.
The drawback of this method is that it gives the proper results only for large
values of the bias κ. As the parameter κ measures the bias, the cluster structure
obtained for κ = 0.3 can be expected also for all larger κ.
Summarizing, in our recent model [18] the coupling of altruism and repu-
tation was described as a possible mechanism of successful cooperation. Here
we have shown that the same model can be generalized by adding the own-
group preference to individual values of the parameter of altruism. With this
modification, the model is able to reproduce the process of group formation.
The groups formed in this way can be detected by current methods of search of
cluster structure. In particular, the method based on differential equations [20]
allowed to separate out two groups of agents cooperating within their groups.
According to this method, uncooperative agents remain outside clusters.
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